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I shall tff in this discussion to cover three related 
sets of issues. First, recent underlying trends common to 
Western Europe and the'United States. Second, a few of the 
major economic problems before us. And third, the issue of 
leadership in our societies and in the world economy. 
Recent Trends 
Wit~out attempting to be exhaustive, I would suggest 
three trends which contribute to the complexity of contemporary 
economic problems. 
The first trend relates to the intensive push and pull 
among political pressures which has ·.resulted in a marked 
change in the economic characteristics\ of our soc·ieties in 
recent years. The so-called single interest pressure group 
has made development of a national consensus especia~ly 
difficult. A certain "refeudalization" of politics has 
taken place, as individuals -- perhaps reacting to the 
bigness and distance of government -- seek to amplify their 
voices through participation in these groups. The abili~y 
of governments or broad political parties· t~_ .. palance corn-
. ..., - . r·:: . 
peting interests, and aggregate them into'policies which have 
the support of a substantial percentage of the electorate is 
correspondingly diminished. 
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The industrialized democracies, in this respect, share 
a common dilemma. On the one hand our democratic tradition 
demands that our institutions be sensitive to a wide variety 
of interests. On the other hand, because individuals 
increasingly express themselves on many issues not through 
elected district or state representatives who can at that 
;rather, 
level aggregate them, but as part of specifically focused, 
nation-wide constituencies, democratic governments firtd it 
difficult to formulate and implement broad policies which 
serve the long-term national interest. 
These pressure groups, as well as individual citizens, 
have become adept in using the system -- the bureaucracies, 
regulatory bodies, the legislatures, and, most strikingly, 
the courts -- to block or at least s~bstantially delay 
policies which they find distasteful~ ~n this post-Vietnam, 
l 
post-Watergate era, the political diss~nt of the 60s has been 
.'_:.~.,... 
translated into the economic dissent of the 70s. Thps, while 
we have become in one sense more democratized throug~. greater 
access to the instruments of power, we have in another sense 
become considernbly less so. It hns become difficult to mold, 
or even identify, a "will of the majority" and even more 
difficult to convince individuals and groups to compromtse 
. 
"4'' 
with, or bend to meet, the democratic con~el).SUSr.··~;· 
...... : .. .. 
The second trend relates to the end~· to which the afore-
mentioned pressures are directed. The economic success of 
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the industrialized democracies since World War II has 
resulted in new types of economic demands being placed on 
governments. The progress of the last 25 years -- most 
clearly manifest in the dramatic improvements in living 
and working conditions -- has brought the average American 
and European a life-style which a generation ago would have 
been considered a prerogative of only the very rich. 
Because of this success, the emphasis of government 
economic policies appears to have shifted. In earlier 
years the achievement of rapid economic grmvth was a strong 
unifying objective behind which broad political coalitions 
could rally and to which narrower interests were generally 
subordinated. Today the goal of economic growth is often 
indirectly dominated by social, envirpnmental, and distri-
butional goals. I stress the word "i-ndirectly" because, 
\. 
except for a relatively small number of.people or groups 
. .; .. .,.. 
opposed to further economic growth, few want to believe that 
the measures they advocate will reduce economic growth, just 
as few want to believe that the single action they support 
will contribute to inflation. But many actions taken._by 
governments, however virtuous the motive, tend cumulatively 
to reduce productivity, place a drag on growth, and. contribute 
to inflationary pressures. 
. 
These same social and equity concerns lead toward 
policies which attempt to minimize, or protect citizens from, 
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risk-- be it from a nuclear reactor, the noise of the 
Concorde, or competition from imports. The strong desire 
to preserve what we have, ·frequently undermines our willing-
ness to accept the kinds of changes which would produce 
:!~~~4: greater economic well-being in the long run but with 
....... -. ·--. ·' ... :.~! 
painful adjustment or risk to certain individuals or groups. 
···':··,·.-·:":'"" The trade-off of less risk for less growth may be entirely 
appropriate in many circumstances. Given, however, the 
difficulty of identifying the long-term economic costs of 
each risk-averting decision when that decision is made, I 
have to question whether we are fully conscious of the 
implications of this trade-off. 
Economic policy-makers must therefore cope with a 
growing section of the population which is interested in 
preserving the status quo along with qnother substantial 
-
portion which believes that improvements·:~n quality of 
life are costless -- that society has little need to make 
.:J:" 
hard choices or set priorities and that multiple demands 
can be accommodated. 
The third trend, which follows from the first two, is 
toward greater uncertainty and a consequent lack of long-
.. 
term focus in government policies. The practica~.~conomic 
... . .~.. ·-; 
result of the pressures I have identified~, i:s tha't> economic 
.. 
policy tends more often than not to be erratic. Leaders 
frequently adjust policies to accommodate popular sentiment. 
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New legal or social considerations are constantly being 
injected into our economic planning. As leaders or insti-
tutions attempt to satisfy political or social sentiments 
of the moment, they tend to focus less on the longer-term 
problems and to ignore the cumulative effects of their 
actions. A striking example of this trend is found in the 
many new sources of inflation being built into our economies 
through policies many to be sure with considerable merit 
which respond to relatively short-term pressures. The 
inhibiting effect on investment in new capacity and jobs 
of uncertainties resulting from frequent changes in economic 
rules is another good example. In addition to these economic 
costs there is also a political cost. While the body politic 
demands quick responses to current p~essures, it tends to 
judge leaders, institutions, and syste~s primarily by their 
ability to resolve longer-term problems s~h as inflation 
and growth. Thus, there may be an inverse correlation 
~' 
between efforts to satisfy short-term political pressures 
and long-term political support. 
Let me punctuate this rather pessimistic train of 
thought by identifying two developments which appear to be 
moving in the opposite direction, toward_a simplif~cation of 
the process of economic management. ?'-.-::. 
The first is that the popular sentiment for an increased 
government role in economic affairs seem to have abated on 
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both sides of the Atlantic. The recent economic.difficulties 
experienced by our societies have brought about a rethinking 
of the proper role of government. Large budget deficits, 
high taxes, over-regulation, and doubts as to the ability of 
the government to outguess the market in investment policy 
have created sentiment in many quarters for a reduction, or 
at least a standstill, in the current level of government 
intervention. In Western Europe today, we see less pressure 
for nationalization, growing disenchantment with state-owned 
enterprises, and a recognition of the need for a revitalized 
private sector. In a fecent poll in the United Kingdom, 
78 percent of those questioned said they were opposed to 
further nationalization. The recent liberalization measures 
of Prime Minister Barre in France imply a marked change in 
attitude in that country. Even the It~lian Communist Party 
has recently expressed disenchantment wit~ state-owned 
corporations. In the United States, there appear to·be 
~_. 
strong popular views that a reduction in government regula-
tion and in disincentives to capital formation in the private 
sector may well help stimulate lagging investment and· 
reduce inflation. 
The second countertrend is the greater percep~ion of 
several national leaders of the politicaL,a~'-:;en··::as the 
.. 
economic benefits of establishing and adhering to consistent 
policy directions. Leaders who have adopted consistent 
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economic policies have generated renewed public confidence 
in their leadership and in the economic systems over which 
they preside. A few cases stand out. While perhaps greeted 
with less than total enthusiasm initially, the policies of 
Giscard and Barre have generated growing public confidence 
both because of their perceived correctness and because of 
the apparent determination of the French leadership to adhere 
to them. The policies of Prime Minister Callaghan and 
Chancellor Healey, also unpopular in some quarters initially, 
have led to a long-term strengthening of confidence in Britain 
and important improvements in the British economy. These 
policies have led to a firmi~g of economic activity in France 
and a strong recovery in the U.K. Political stability in 
both countries has increased as a result. 
Four Major Economic Issues 
Let me now turn to several issues wh.Lch, against this 
backdrop, our societies must address more forcefully~ While 
concern over unemployment and inflation compete for attention, 
the problem of inflation appears today to have emerged the 
victor in competition for attention in the US and, r·believe, 
in many of the countries of Western Europe. The problem 
seems so intractable, it affects all people in any society, 
and its adverse economic effects tend to divtde _..we'stern 
... , .. . 
. 
societies. The middle classes who find their savings eroded 
and their life-styles deteriorating feel that the rich 
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can protect themselves while the poor are protect~d by 
government welfare programs. This attitude puts pressure 
on programs designed to benefit lower income groups. · 
Many of the causes of inflation are built into our 
economies through legislation and regulation. The most 
frequently advocated prescription against inflation, however, 
appears to be tighter fiscal and monetary policy. While 
such a prescription is in many cases the right one, it 
frequently tends to divert attention from the need for 
governments to be considerably more aware of the inflationary 
implications of specific decisions in such areas as environ-
mental protection, health and safety regulations, minimum 
wages, agricultural policy, and import restrictions. 
As I noted earlier, it is easy bp argue that any given 
policy in itself is not going to signi~icantly increase 
inflation. But the cumulative impact of -small individual 
measures can indeed be significant -- and has been. -Moreover, 
~ 
as a result of this accumulation of measures, governments' 
credibility, needed to persuade business to hold down prices 
and labor to hold down wage demands, is considerably reduced. 
Societies will from time to time inevitably decide for 
entirely ·appropriate reasons to take actions which ?re 
. , . 
inflationary. But if the inflationary tre17-d:..'j_'~ 'f6::: be reversed, 
we must be considerably more judicious about the selection 
and timing of such actions. As a beginning, we should 
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strengthen the presumption against measures which increase 
inflationary pressures and undertake a more energetic effort 
to remove previously built-in rigidities. 
While such an approach would undoubtedly be burdensome 
to certain groups, the costs would be smaller for society 
at large than the ultimate costs of inappropriate actions 
or of delaying appropriate actions. If and when necessary, 
action to alleviate the costs to individuals, such as 
protection of a dying industry, should be temporary and 
should aim to facilitate adjustment rather than to preserve 
the status quo. Such an orientation would not only directly 
reduce inflation but would also establish a longer-term 
expectation that inflation will decline. I am, for instance, 
struck by the fact that Germany has a higher rate of money 
creation and a larger budget deficit as~a percentage of GNP 
than the U.S. at the same time that it ha.$_an inflation 
rate of less than one-half that of the U.S. I suspect that 
one important reason for this good performance on infiation 
results from widespread expectations on the part of the 
citizenry that the German government will act in non-inflationary 
ways, that labor and business will act in a similar spirit, 
. 
and that·the efforts of all the maior acrors to hold down 
inflation will be mutually reinforcing. 
The second critical economic problem we need to address 
is that of energy. Our ability to adapt to the new global 
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energy situation through a reduction in our reliance on 
imported oil is critical to the resumption of sustained 
economic growth, as well as to our political and security 
interests. We have a temporary respite because of new 
supplies from the North Sea and Alaska, and slow economic 
growth in many countries. It is, however, no better than 
being in the eye of a hurricane. Unless we make a more 
purposeful effort, particularly in my own country, the 
problem can only worsen dramatically. 
While· efforts to increase energy production are perhaps 
the most important element in the solution, I should like to 
focus on one of the less discussed elements -- energy-saving 
capital investment. We are seeing some reduction in the 
ratio of energy to output in our econpmies. Elementary 
economics tells us that as energy becomes more expensive 
~ ... 
we should begin to see a substitution of ~abor and energy-
efficient capital for energy-intensive capital. Recent data 
lead to the conclusion that this substitution is begi~ning 
to take place. Some observers suggest that this is at least 
part c~ the explanation for the reduction in unemployment in 
the United States. 
But the adjustment to date has only been parti~l. The 
sharp increase in oil prices made part of ··<?ur···capital stock 
obsolete, causing firms to idle some of their most energy-
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intensive equipment. Productivity fell as fewer ~oods 
were produced by the same number of workers, a develop-
ment which along with high energy cost per unit of 
output contributed to inflation. Increased capital 
costs and low-capacity utilization are holding back 
the replacement of obsolete and inefficient capital . 
Uncertainty about energy policies, prices, supply 
availability, and regulation retards replacement 
still further. 
Higher rates of economic growth in our 
countries will lead to longer-term conservation by 
encouraging investment in new capital equipment, even 
though the short-term increase in oil imports such 
growth implies draws greater attentiori. More speci-
fically, however, tax and energy policies aimed at 
speedy adjustment of capital stock would facilitate 
increased investment in energy-efficient equipment, 
thus also increasing productivity and employment 
and reducing inflation. Also, as I noted earlier, 
the private sector must have confidence that govern-
ment policies will be stable and consistent before 
co~~itting investment funds. 
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A third problem is youth unemployment. The, figures 
are staggering. ·rn the OECD area as a whole, unemployment 
rates for those between the ages of 15 and 24 are on 
;as overall unemployment rates • 
average three times as high The unemployment rate in 
this country for black teenagers is nearly 40 percent~-
The social costs of this situation are enormous because 
unemployed young people -- especially blacks and other 
groups already disadvantaged -- feel they have no place 
in society, fall further and further behind others who 
get entry-level jobs, and come to altogether reject the 
society that spurned them. The seeds of rage are building 
in our society as this rejected group becomes larger. 
While no easy answers exist, the problem is serious 
enough that we should reassess many ~spects of our economies 
which have long been taken for granted.~to identify solutions. 
\. 
For instance, many countries, in pursuit~~f their social/ 
economic priorities, have instituted various system3 of 
taxes on employment which, in some cases, may be couhter-
productive. For ~nstance, in attempting to assure adequate 
retirement and other benefits through social security and 
equitable wage levels through the minimum wage, labor costs 
. 
may be ratcheted up to the point that th~y reduce employment 
. . 
. ~· 
opportunities. Similarly 1 increasing jOQ; se'cl:trit;"y 1 through 
laws which make it so difficult to lay off workers that firms 
are reluctant to hire new ones, can similarly frustrate the 
specific goals these programs aim to achieve. 
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Fourth is the problem of adjustment to imports from the 
developing countries. Manufactured goods -- both labor and 
capital-intensive -- have been rapidly replacing raw materials 
in the export profiles of the more advanced developing 
countries. Since 1955 manufactured goods as a share of 
developing country export earnings have expanded from 10 to 
40 percent, and significant further growth is anticipated . 
To put this development in perspective, roughly 23 
percent (nearly $34 billion) of total US imports in 1977 
came from non-OPEC developing countries. The comparable 
figure for Western Europe is about 10 percent. Nonetheless, 
concern is high on both sides of the Atlantic about the rate 
of penetration of imports in key sectors, provoking charges 
that developing countries have an~ "unfair advantage" in 
labor-intensive manufacturing. 
To better understand this problem, a few facts are 
.'.;~,... 
worth noting. First, while imports do, admittedLy, displace 
workers in sensitive industries, the amount of di?placement 
is considerably smaller than that which results f.rom 
productivity improvements, competition, and industrial 
consolidation within our countries. A study of the German 
economy, for instance, has shown that, in the manufacturing 
sector, growth of productivity during the-"1962:.;1975 period 
. ,_.,! - • .,/"":" •. 
displaced 48 workers for every one di~placed by imports from 
developing countries. The fact that job displacement results 
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in p·roductivity improvements and to improved consumer 
welfare and lower rates of inflation is clear. Imports 
do likewise, although their displacement effects are more 
noticeable than their benefits. 
Second, imports from developing countries represent 
only a small portion of total supply (imports and domestic 
production) in importing countries. Even in the area of 
clothing, where import penetration has been rapid, developing 
countries supplied only about 7 percent of US consumption 
in 1976, up from less than 3 percent in 1970. In other 
developed countries the figures are comparable. 
Third, in spite of the rapid growth of imports of 
manufactures from developing countries, both the European 
Corrununity and the US continue to run~large surpluses in trade in 
manufactured goods with these countries. In fact, the buoy-
ancy of developing country economies, ·mqde possible by 
... ~ 
substantial borrowing in international capital markets, 
helped maintain demand for developed country products 
during the last recession. Together the developing world 
provides the most dynamic market for our exports. in this 
decade, for example, sales of US goods to developing coun-
tries grew by 22 percent per year as compared to 15 percent 
-· 
growth in US sales to developed countri~s ~-- ~TQday our manufac-
... , .. .. 
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tured exports to the LDCs exceed our combined manufactured 
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exports to Europe and Japan. A restriction on imports from 
developing countries is, in effect, tantamount to a restric-
tion on our exports to developing countries. 
Fourth, the problem has taken on a particularly 
emotional dimension in some_countries in Western Europe. 
Many Europeans fear that Europe will be unable to compete 
with the US in future grmvth sectors such as computers and 
aircraft while traditional capital-intensive industries 
such as steel, paper and chemicals will continue to suffer 
from overcapacity and labor-intensive industries such as 
footwear, consumer electronics, and textiles face 
increased competition from the developing nations. 
The response of the industrialized democracies to 
this challenge can essentially be ~et in only one of two 
ways -- through appropriate adjustment or through increasing 
t . 
' 
protectionism. Adjustment will entail:.~ome dislocations, 
which specific groups will clearly, and in their view legiti-
~· 
mately, resist. Protectionist measures to help such groups 
may enjoy short-term popularity and will be hard for govern-
ments to resist. We may not notice the consequent ·loss of 
high wage exports' jobs which would result from a reduced 
ability of developing countries to buy from us. We would 
probably think even less about the jobs.{,tna~ eo~ld have been 
.. 
created but never were because we did not seize the oppor-
tunities which appropriate adjustme~t and trade expansion 
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create. Individuals.may argue, as I noted earlier, that 
actions to protect their interests will have only minor 
inflationary consequences even though taken together they 
contribut-e significantly to inflationary pressures and 
expectations . 
The alternative path is what has coMe to be known as 
positive adjustment. At the June OECD Ministerial meeting 
and again at the Bonn Summit the industrial countries went 
beyond their pledge of previous years to avoid trade 
restrictions. They agreed on guidelines for positive 
adjustment which recognize that defensive measures designed 
to maintain existing employment or to preserve existing 
productive capacity in inefficient industries tend over 
time to reduce productivity and to:inhibit sustained 
non-inflationary growth. The OECD countries agreed that 
a more positive approach should be based, to the extent 
possible, on market forces to encourage the movement of 
~-labor and capital to their most productive uses. In those 
rare cases where protective actions can be justified, the 
actions are to be temporary, progressively reducedi and 
linked to plans to phase-out obsolete capacity. Emphasis 
is to be placed on positive measures such as training,· 
improved labor mobility, and work repla<;:erne~t_...ifiorder to 
facilitate adjustment to shifting demands, technological 
proryress, and changing patterns of trade . 
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The concept of positive adjustment is unlikely to ~ake 
firm root in developed countries, unless similar actions are 
undertaken by developing countries. It is difficult to ask 
the citizens of the industrialized countries to undertake 
painful structural adjustments which provide new export 
opportunities to the developing countries unless the latter 
are also willing to open up their markets. A number of 
developing countries which have been particularly successful 
as exporters unnecessarily restrict imports. This feeds 
pressures for protectionism in developed countries and 
discourages positive adjustment. It is also very much in 
the interests of developing countries to rationalize their 
own domestic policies. Those that have, for instance, 
adopted appropriate exchange rate policies, undertaken 
. 
rational pricing policies, and direc~ed resources to indus-
tries that have a comparative advantag~,._are the more efficient 
and dynamic international competitors. 
The Politics of the World Economy 
Let me nm.,r turn briefly to the politics of in_ternational 
economics. Shared responsibility for the management of the 
international economy is increasingly important as domestic 
~· 
economic management becomes more and more dependent on the 
world economy and vice versa. 
~ ...... ,.,-. -.. 
.. r·· 
The Bonn ··summit underscored 
' 
the emergence of Germany and Japan as countries willing to 
play a greater leadership role in the world eCOJ?Omy. Nhile' 
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we tend today to assume that our countries will cooperate 
in difficult economic situations, that was not always the 
case. During the inter-war period, leaders of many major 
economic powers attempted to solve their domestic problems 
at the expense of other countries. Seated around the table 
in Bonn, however, were a group of leaders much more cognizant 
of the interests they shared because they had recognized 
the cost of unilateral actions in an interdependent world 
and the critical impact of the international economy on 
their own nation's economic well-being. None of these 
leaders, I believe, has illusions that his country could 
achieve prosperity at the expense of others. All of the 
leaders projected an economic sophistication and expertise 
resulting from the experience whi~h heads of state and 
. 
government have accumulated through ~he-joint debate of 
":... 
difficult economic issues. The lead~rship of the industrial 
··-
democracies is today more international and more economically 
experienced than at perhaps any time in this century. 
Another element which contributes to the strengthening 
of shared responsibility, and which is too often taken for 
granted, is the existence of the European Community. 
Imagine, if you will, the difficulties of managing re~~nt 
,• 
events if there were no Community and i:r:tdiV'id:l,lai European 
.... , . . . 
. . 
countries went off in different directions or worked at 
cross purposes. The framework of the Community imposes ·a 
· ... -~ . ; . 
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requirement to work out common or relatively consistent 
policies. While that effort is not entirely without friction, 
the degree of difficulty is minor compared with the trials 
of managing differences in the absence of the Community . 
Although Americans from time to time complain about Community 
policy in one area or another, there is little doubt that 
economic cooperation within Europe gives a desireable 
consistency and stability to US economic relations with 
Europe. 
Our Atlantic economic relationship is only one dimen-
sion of the global economy. Both the EC and the US have 
an increasingly dynamic economic relationship with Japan. 
Tvhile Japan has long been content to simply react to events 
in the world economy, we are now seeing a greater willingness 
on the part of Japan to assert its interests. Although it 
is not easy to break the pattern of hungreds of years, 
Japanese leaders are making the effort to open up ~apan's 
relatively closed economy. In the area of trade, Japan has 
come a long way in the direction of liberalizing imports. 
And while more progress is called for in some area~, Japan 
has moved in directions more comparable with the open economy 
so essential to its long-term prosperity, and to dispel 
critic ism that it enjoys access to oth~-~ ma':r:k~t:s while unfairly 
impeding access to its own. The process will not be furthered 
by the strident criticism or demands for punitive actiorr all 
: .. . ~ ... ' : 
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• ::>:.::;~·r.:'• 
;,.•- i .. ·. 
· .. · 
.·,: 
' 
-20-
too often heard in some quarters of Europe and the US. The 
stronge5t possible collaboration between the EC, Japan and 
the US is a prerequisite for a prosperous and orderly world 
economy in coming years. 
We must also deal with an increasingly assertive Third 
World. Only at our peril can we avoid including the major 
OPEC and Third World trading nations in important global 
decjsions. Patterns of cooperation between developed and 
developing countries are less advanced than those which have 
been nurtured for years among developed countries in the 
OECD and else\vhere. t.Ye must therefore fashion new modes of 
consultation to insure that we better understand the 
perceptions of developing countries, that they better 
understand our O\m perceptions, and that common objectives 
can be more easily identified. 
l 
' 
Conclusion: 
Having spelled out a number of broad observations on 
the direction in which our economic and political Jystems 
are moving and having noted the problems on which I believe 
we should concentrate as well as the importance of interna-
tional cooperation in reso}ving those problems, let me con-
clude on an optimistic note. The industrialized democracies 
. 
. .. 
have gone throu<Jh an extremely difficul.tt, per.iodt During this 
period we have managed not simply to avoid a deterioration 
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. 
in international economic cooperation, but to a~tually 
strengthen it significantly. Greater cooperation among 
senior monetary officials, more extensive use of the OECD, 
the creation of the International.Energy Agency and the 
institution of economic Summitry are four important examples 
of such improved cooperation. 
We have also begun to adopt our domestic policies to 
meet new demands and new conditions. While in many cases 
far greater effort is necessary, in the areas I have men-
tioned and others, progress has been made in increasing 
growth, lowering rates of inflation and reducing payments 
imbalances between OPEC and non-OPEC countries. In addition, 
our societies have continued to press forward the frontiers 
of modern technology in such areas ~f solar energy, computers 
and genetic research. We continue to~set the standards for 
\ 
' 
huma1~ rights, for respect for the dignit¥ of the individual 
and for the free competition of ideas. 
It is important to remember that while our societies 
clearly have problems, we have also demonstrated resiliency 
and a capacity for self-correction. In a world trying to 
improve the quality of life for all mankind, to solve 
. 
major technological problems, and to achieve sustained· 
prosperity, it is the industrialized de~ocra9ie~:which have 
' 
denonstrated repeatedly that they can find the answers. 
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Given effective and purposeful leadership and c_ooperation, 
a greater understanding of the interrelationships among 
the various problems we face and a clearer policy focus on our 
priorities, we will continue to find the answers • 
, . 
. . 
